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multinationalism and poly-ethnicism; 123 legal rights and moral rights; 124 first- and 
second-class rights; 125 inherent and contingent rights; 1¥lghts to collective 
interests and the rights of collective agents; 127 political collective rights and 
substantial collective rights; 128 an integrity concept of rights and an agency 
concept of rights; 129 fully voluntary groups, entry-voluntary groups, entrance­
involuntary but exit-voluntary groups and fully involuntary groups; 130 negative 
liberty and positive liberty; 131 classical rights and social rights; 132 rights as 
individualistic, exclusionary "quasi-absolute debate stopping conclusions" and 
rights as relational, open-ended sites of dialogue and struggle.133 
Thus, it seems to me that the post-rationalist turn and the various debates 
around rights have served both to ground and expand the imagination of high 
theory, particularly to the extent that such theory has, historically, been identified 
with the decontextualism of analytical positivism. 134 
D. The Development of Working and Middle-Order Theories 
While Twining sees both of these spheres of theory as closely related, for 
exposition purposes he tends to separate them. I will also deal first with middle­
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i) Middle-Order Theory 
Twining is not as clear on this task as he is on some of the others but the 
suggestion is that middle theory operates in the realm between those academics 
who operate in the domain of high theory and those who toil in the field of legal 
doctrinal analysis. Here the target market seems primarily to be other legal 
academics and the chore is to develop "fertile hypotheses to guide research and 
inquiry in various areas .... " 135 Twining proposes that middle-order theorizing can 
help stimulate further scholarship, not only in "new and neglected fields of 
study," but also generate a "rethinking [of] old ones."136 Whereas the conduit and 
high theory approaches to jurisprudence have a centrifugal dynamic, middle­
order theory is more centripetal, or inward looking. It is an exercise in filling the 
gap between high theory and the pragmatics of Eractical legal discourse
137 and, 
as such, attempts to be a functional discourse. 1 8 This form of theory does not 
attempt to generate substantive right answers, but rather to create coherent and 
intelligible frames of reference within which others - lawyers, judges or other 
academics - can make sense of the tasks they encounter. I will suggest three 
examples in the Charter context of middle-order theorizing: the debate on the 
legitimacy of judicial review; the question of the application of the Charter and 
reliance upon the public/private dichotomy; and the issue of appropriate Charter 
remedies. 
A review of the literature indicates that the dominant jurisprudential concern 
of the last fifteen years has been the issue of the legitimacy of judicial review. 139 
.An avalanche of interpretive theories have been advanced by Canadian theorists 
in order to provide guidance for the judiciary as to the proper approach to adopt 
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pragmatism; 143 social criticism; 144 egalitarian liberalism; 145 liberal legalism; 146 
postliberal pluralism; 147 democratic communitarian proceduralism; 148 a process 
theory;149 a co-ordinate model; 150 substantive rationality review;151 institutional 
dialogue; 152 democratic colloquy premised upon a weak form of parliamentary 
sovereignty; 153 a grammatical approach in pursuit of self-understanding; 15i 
philosophical, contextual and justice inspired approach; 155 a teleological 
interpretive discourse/practice; 156 postmodern communitarian realism grounded 
in a communicative ethos; 157 responsive asymmetricalism; 158 philosophical 
realism; 159 and "a complex partnership through institutional dialogue between 
supercourts and superlegislatures."160 These analyses often are structured around 
a review of the relationship between the limitations clause (section 1) and 
substantive Charter provisions.161 
The debate as to the scope of the application of the Charter may provide a 
second example of middle-order theorizing. Of particular importance here is the 
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Charter should only apply to state action, 162 others have argued that it should 
encompass a much larger range of relationships between members of society. 163 
Still others have pointed to the incoherence and arbitrariness of these positions 
because of the way they rely on dichotomous thinking engendered by liberal 
ideology and they invoke decisions such as Dolphin Delivery164 as confirmation 
of the poverty of such c:tnalyses. 165 Often one's position on this debate is 
informed by whether one is more liberal, feminist, democratic or communitarian 
in one's underlying legal philosophy. 166 
The issue of legitimate Charter remedies provides another example of 
middle-order theory: assuming there is a breach of a Charter provision, what is 
the right response? 167 Canadian jurists have been particularly interested in the 
remedy of "reading in." 168 Some have argued that such a strategy is legitimate 
not just because it is implied by section 24 but also on the basis of the argument 
that to allow the courts only the limited remedy of striking down a provision 
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at 565; Elliott & Grant, supra note 163; The Law of the Charter: General Principles, 
supra note 22 at 117; H. Lessard, "The Idea of the 'Private': A Discussion of State 
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Slattery, supra note 163 at 160-61; Whyte, supra note 162. 
J. Cassels, "An Inconvenient Balance: The Injunction as a Charter Remedy" in J. 
Berryman, ed., Remedies: Issues and Perspectives (Scarborough: Thompson, 1991) at 
271; Fitzgerald, supra note 14; R. Gold, "From Right To Remedy: Putting Equality to 
Work" (1989) 14 Queen's L. J. 213. 
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The phrase is attributed to M. McPhedran by Eberts [M. Eberts, "Sex-Based 
Discrimination and the Charter" in Bayefsky & Eberts, supra note 23, 183 at 224] and 
was reiterated in R. v. Schachter, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, 702. 
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rather than making some people better off. However, others have argued that 
such judicial activism is of equivocal value because there can be quite negative 
spin-off effects. 170 Still others struggle to articulate some middle position that 
avoids excessive judicial interventionism while at the same time ensuring 
"progressive" outcomes. 17 1  
Thus, these examples indicate that middle-order theory appears to be a very 
popular form of jurisprudential endeavour. 
ii) The Formulation of Working Theory 
a) Generally 
Twining posits that the jurist who operates at the level of working theory 
seeks "to identify, to articulate and to examine critically ... " 172 the conceptions 
and assumptions of law and legal practice that underlie and inform the juridical 
activities of various legal actors, be they lawyers, judges, law reformers or 
writers of textbooks. The task of the jurist in this role is: 173 
... systematically to examine and bring into the open the working assumptions and operative 
ideas of various kinds of participant in legal processes and to examine these critically in 
the light of some more general conceptions about the nature of our legal culture and the 
actual and potential role of law and lawyers in society. 
A great deal of the work by Charter advocates tends to operate at the level 
of working theory. The projects of such scholars manifest at least four foci. First, 
they seek to broaden the categories of those who can qualify as potential rights 
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foreigners; 176 refugees; 177 mentally disabled persons; 178 convicted criminals; 179 
and the "unskilled, unlucky, and unorganized." 180 Secondly, they seek to expand 
the scope of rights located in the Charter, for example, a right to food, 181 
welfare, 182 nude dancing, 183 and legal aid. 184Thirdly, rights advocates suggest 
reforms that would engender greater public access to the court system. 185 
Fourthly, they propose enhanced remedial powers for the judiciary. 186 
A significant amount of feminist legal theory may operate at the level of 
working theory. Much feminist analysis seeks to take seriously the Charter 's 
canonization of liberty, freedom and (especially) equality but then asks why 
women as a class seem to be excluded from these constitutional norms. Through 
what might be described as a "superliberal strategy,"187 feminists demand that the 
specificity of women's egalitarian rights be constitutionally recognized, thereby 
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Some gay and lesbian jurists develop similar inclusionary arguments 189 and 
appear to have had juridical success in having sexual orientation included as an 
analogous ground under section 15. 190 However, other gay and lesbian scholars 
go beyond (heterosexual) feminist scholars, for example, by problematizing the 
meaning and structure of "family" and "marriage," and again appear to be having 
some possible success. 191 
The exercise of developing working theories is programmatic and 
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42 B.C.L.R. (2d) 294; Knodel ·v. B.C. (1991), 58 B.C.L.R. (2d) 356 (Sup. Ct.); Haig 
v. Canada (1992), 94 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (Ont. C.A.); Egan and Nesbit v. Queen, [1995] 2 
S.C.R. 513. It is to be noted that other lesbians are critical of this "minority rights 
paradigm" arguing that it is premised upon a liberal and formal conception of equality 
that may be accommodative rather than subversive [G. Brodsky, "Out of the Closet and 
Into a Wedding Dress? Struggles for Lesbian and Gay Legal Equality" (1994) 7 
C.J.W.L. 523; Eaton, supra note 39; Herman, supra note 22 at c. 3.] Still others have 
argued that the concept of sexual orientation is problematic in that it obscures the 
different experiences of gays and lesbians and in the pursuit of greater specificity, a 
lesbian legal theory should consider conceptualizing discrimination against lesbians as 
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Identities in the Legal Context" (1994) 7 C.J.W.L. 286.] This, in turn, has raised 
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its agenda. 192 To illustrate this claim I will first review debates in relation to the 
equality provisions and then the Aboriginal provisions of the Charter. 
b) Equality Provisions, ss. 1 5, 28. 
The equality provisions of the Charter have, perhaps, engendered some of 
the most polarised theoretical analyses at the level of working theory. Two sets 
of jurisprudential questions arise in this sphere. First, there is the debate over the 
meaning of equality. Second, there is the question of how do equality rights 
relate to other rights and liberties enshrined in the Charter. Both these questions 
can be most fruitfully addressed through a discussion of feminist engagements 
with equality. 193 
"Equality" is one of those infamous "essentially contested concepts." 194 In 
relation to the Charter, three formulations appear to be pervasive in the 
literature: formal equality, equality of opportunity, and substantive equality. 195 
Formal equality is inspired by an aspiration for universal application. Drawing 
on the tradition of Aristotle, formalists posit that those who are the same should 
be treated alike, while those who are not the same can be treated differently. 
Formal equality is highly individualistic and decontextual in its analysis. 196 
Consequently, it focuses its attention on discriminatory practices that are direct 
and intentional. Equality of opportunity ( or procedural equality) attempts to deal 
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Models of (In)Equality" (1993) 38 McGill L. J. 64 and, "Strangers and Members: 
Equality in an Immigration Setting" (1994) 7 Can. J. Law & Jur. 149. 
A. Bayefsky, "Defining Equality Rights Under the Charter" in Mahoney & Martin, 
supra note 23 at 106; Brodsky & Day, supra note 89 at 81. 
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precisely the same position, and, therefore, it considers whether people are 
similarly situated either socially, economically or culturally. 197 If so, it advocates 
fair play and suggests that some advantages may be given to those who are 
disadvantaged so that they may be able to compete in a fair race. 198 However, if 
they are not similarly situated they can be treated differently. Substantive 
equality (a.k.a. equality of condition or equality of well being) tends to dislike 
the race analogy mostly because it is too procedural. 199 Instead, it espouses 
eq·uality in the distribution of "social goods ."200 Advocates of substantive 
equality reject the sameness/difference comparative framework as indeterminate 
and ideologically loaded and they eschew a robust public/private dichotomy. 
Rather, they take as their starting point inequality, domination and 
disadvantage,2°1 and on this foundation emphasize context specific rather than 
superficially neutral modes of analysis. 202 Consequently, it is argued that we 
should focus less on intentions and procedures and more on outcomes and 
effects. 203 Viewed through this prism, equality must be understood in a more 
caring, contextual and group-sensitive way .204 In short, substantive equality 
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Brodsky & Day, supra note 89 at 147; L. Trakman, "Substantive Equality in 
Constitutional Jurisprudence: Meaning Within Meaning" (1994) 7 Can. J. Law & Jur. 
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Brodsky & Day, supra note 89 at c. 8; K. Lahey, "Feminist Theories of (In)Equality" 
in Mahoney & Martin, supra note 23 at 7 1 ;  D. Majury, "Equality and Discrimination 
According to the Supreme Court of Canada" (1990) 4 C.J.W.L. 407. This view is 
developed most fully by Catharine MacKinnon. See, for example, "Making Sex 
Equality Real" in Smith, supra note 23 at 37. 
Eberts et al., supra note 9 at 21. 
Sheppard, supra note 199. See also W. Black, "Intent or Effects: Section 15 of the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms" in Weiler & Elliott, supra note 4 at 120; 
"Discrimination and Its Justification: Coping with Equality Rights Under the Charter," 
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C. Boyle & S. Noonan, "Prostitution and Pornography: Beyond Formal Equality" in 
Boyle et al., supra note 23 at 225; Brodsky & Day, supra note 89 at c. 2 & c. 7; Fudge, 
supra note 99 at 496-97; Razack, supra note 88 at 103; Sheppard, supra note 108. 
The fair shares/fair play characterization was introduced by the political scientist Jill 
Vickers in "Majority Equality Issues of the Eighties" ( 1983) 1 Can. Hum. Rts. Y.B. 47. 
See also Jackman, supra note 182. For an argument that even the fair shares vision is 
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These arguments have had critical purchase in a series of recent cases. 
Feminists, for example, in order to avoid the Bill of Rights mentality of formal 
equality,206 have emphasized not only the affirmative action provisions of section 
15(2) and the intei:pretive mandate of section 28,207 but also the expansive 
wording of section 1 5(1) and, in particular, the "before and under the law" and 
the "equal protection and equal benefit of the law';rovisions.208 Such arguments 
were endorsed by the Supreme Court in Brooks2 when it explicitly overruled 
its decision in Bliss210 decided a inere ten years earlier. Moreover, in Andrews, 2 1 1  
Turpin212 and Butler,213 the Supreme Court also seems to have accepted 
arguments by the feminist litigational think tank, LEAF, that the most 
appropriate conception of equality is one that rejects formalist and similarly­
situated approaches and instead adopts a conception that focuses on 
"disadvantage." Such an interpretation is quite closely connected to substantive 
conceptions of equality, and shifts the prism of analysis from the 
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Herman argues that even this version of equality may not go far enough because 
there is a real danger that the recognition of gay and lesbian equality rights is premised 
upon an immutability (or status) argument (as opposed to a choice or conduct argument) 
which, in turn, is premised upon an unproblematized assumption of heterosexual 
normality. Herman, supra note 22 at c. 3. See also C. Stychin, "Essential Rights and 
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Similar feminist analyses appear to have a ripple effect on non-Charter Supreme 
Court decisions such as Janzen,215 La.vallee,216 and Moge. 217 Such "victories" 
have encouraged other feminists to build upon these breakthroughs to argue for 
an enlarged sphere of influence for equality rights.218 
This contextual and substantive conception of equality has also had 
repercussions for the second category of equality issues: the relationship between 
the equality provisions and other rights, liberties and freedoms outlined in the 
Charter.219 Feminists have pointed to section 28 (which, they note, cannot be 
overridden by section 33) to argue that when read in conjunction with section 15, 
equality should be understood as an anchor right which should prevail if it 
conflicts with another right.220 This prioritization of equality rights appears to 
have been accepted, to some degree, by McIntyre J. in Andrews.221 
Perhaps the classic and most controversial example of such theorizing is to 
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pornography jurists have invoked the equality rights of sections 1 5  and 28 
against the freedom of ex�ression provisions of section 2(b) invoked by 
pornographers and liberals. 2 2 Similar patterns of analysis have emerged in the 
· sexual assault context where accused men have claimed that the rape shield 
provisions of the Criminal Code violate their right to a fair trial under section 1 1  
and feminists have replied that these are trumped by sections 1 5  and 28.223 
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However, not all feminists have been as optimistic as either liberal feminists 
in their accommodation to the "paradigm shift" engendered by the Charter,225 or 
radical feminist deviations with, and revolutionary reconstructions of, the 
Charter.226 For examEle, some feminists have queried just how flexible Charter 
language might be2 7 and identified just how channelling and constraining 
constitutional discourse can be.228 Others have highlighted the way in which the 
equality and other provisions of the Charter have been used against women 
thereby forcing feminist organizations into problematic and expensive defensive 
strategies.229 Hess230 and Seaboye?-31 are invoked as examples of the trumping 
argument failing miserably.232 So too might Daviault.233 Other observers have 
identified the dangers inherent in the "categorization game" and have argued that 
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complex and overlapping identities, for example, on the basis of race, class or 
sexual orientation. 234 
Similar debates have been generated by feminist adaptations of section 7, the 
liberty principle, explicitly in the example of Wilson J . '  s decision in 
Morgentaler,235 and how in reality such an approach may not necessarily 
improve women's access to abortion because it reconstitutes the public/private 
dichotomy236 and relies on quite problematic liberal assumptions. 237 
Moreover, Mary Ellen Turpel challenges both the cultural imperialism of the 
Charter framework and, specifically, the discourse of gender equality. Invoking 
Audre Lourde' s famous aphorism that "the master's tools cannot dismantle the 
master's house," she argues in obvious rebuttal to some feminist analyses238 that 
equality is "simply not the central organizing political principle" of First Nations 
communities.239 Instead, she advocates in favour of cultural self-determination 
and suggests that the _problem of "patronage is not universal."240 Thus, for 
Turpel, sexism within the First Nations communities is a by-product of 
colonialism that can only be remedied once "cultural" self-determination has 
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state intervention and a "preconceived notion of gender equality,"241 they may 
run the danger of paternalism in relation to First Nations women.242 
This debate provides a useful bridge to the second domain of working theory, 
the Aboriginal provisions. 
c) Aboriginal Provisions 
There is little within the Charter itself that relates to First Nations people. 
Although First Nations lobbied in the early 1980s for a constitutional declaration 
that their original rights under treaties and the Royal Proclamation of 1763 
should be reinstated, federal and provincial procrastination thwarted such 
demands. In lieu, all that the First Nations were able to attain within the Charter 
was section 25, a saving provision which instructs judges not to interpret the 
Charter "so as to abrogate or derogate from any Aboriginal, treaty or other rights 
or freedoms that pertain to the Aboriginal peoples of Canada." Although they are 
not part of the Charter, I think that sections 35 and 37 are also relevant in that 
they have a direct impact upon debates around the Charter. Section 35 
"recognizes and affirms ... existing Aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal 
peoples of Canada." Section 37 provides for a series of First Ministers 
conferences on Aboriginal affairs, a process which, from the First Nations 
perspective, achieved very little.243 Finally, section 15, the generic equality 
provision, also applies to First Nations peoples.244 
Most of the scholarship on the Aboriginal provisions tends to be doctrinal. 






Ibid. at 188. 
For an attempt to mediate these two apparently contradictory positions by focusing on 
s. 35(4) see D. Greschner, "Aboriginal Women, the Constitution and Criminal Justice" 
(1992) U.B.C. L. Rev. (Special Ed.) 338. 
Francophone feminists have expressed a similar argument in the context of the 
relationship between the distinct society clause of the Meech Lake Accord and the 
Charter when many Anglo feminists feared that their equality rights were in danger. 
M. Turpel, "The Charlottetown Discord and Aboriginal Peoples' Struggle for 
Fundamental Political Change" in K. McRoberts & P. Monahan, The Charlottetown 
Accord, the Referendum and the Future of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1993) at 117. 
Sanders suggests that s. 27 might also have some indirect influence. D. Sanders, 
"Article 27 and the Aboriginal People's of Canada" in Multiculturalism and the 
Charter, supra note 23 at 155. 
Revue d'etudes constitu tionnelles 
58 Richard F. Devlin 
sections so as to enhance potential rights claims by the First Nations.245 
Surprisingly, section 25 has generated very little jurisprudential analysis.246 
However section 35 has encouraged several scholars to articulate some broader 
working theory of its effect: that it entrenches a constitutional trust;247 that it 
signifies a constitutional commitment of honour;248 that it operates as a distinct 
and special Charter for Aboriginal peoples;249 or more radically still, that it is a 
constitutional acknowledgement of an already existing, continuing and inherent 
(as opposed to contingent) right of self determination/government.250 These 
readings, in turn, have led some authors to argue that there is a constitutional 
mandate to recognize and promote culturally-specific Aboriginal criminal justice 
systems.251 
It was the decision in Sparrow,252 however, which most obviously has 
cranked the jurisprudential mill. In particular, jurists have concentrated on the 
Supreme Court' s  determination that although section 35 recognized the sui 
generis nature of Aboriginal rights, such rights were still subject to a 
reasonableness standard analogous to that of section 1 ,  even though section 1 
does not apply to section 35 because the latter is not part of the Charter. This has 
raised important questions about appropriate judicial interpretive method, 
paternalism, colonialism, conceptions of the rule of law and sovereignty, judicial 
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At the most profound political and jurisprudential level, some have argued 
that the Charter is deeply problematic from a First Nations perspective not only 
because it was imposed upon First Nations peoples without consent, 254 but also 
because it represents modes of thought and social relations that are said to be 
incompatible with the aspiration for self-determination. There is also the 
problem of the rights of internal minorities. 255 This is exemplified, as already 
noted, in the debate about the relationship between self-government/ 
determination, gender and race and whether equality (and indeed which version 
of equality256) should be seen as the trumping constitutional norm. 257 Such con­
cerns have surfaced most recently in relation to the Charlottetown Accord 
whereby First Nations were recognized as constituting a "third order of 
government," possessing significant powers for self-government. 258 Most 
importantly, the Accord acknowledged that First Nations could potentially avoid 
the application of the Charter on the basis of the incommensurability argument. 
This exclusion caused concern among some Aboriginal women who argued 
( contrary to Turpel' s position259) that they required the protection of the equality 
provisions of the Charter against potential sexual discrimination within the 
Aboriginal community.260 Recently, it has been suggested that one way to resolve 
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Charters of Rights reflecting First Nations' world views. 261 The lack of specificity 
of such proposals· at this point in time makes it difficult to determine if the 
incommensurability problem can be resolved. 
In sum, what these various examples of working theory suggest is that 
contemporary Canadian jurists believe that legal doctrine matters, but that 
doctrine is not simply a matter of rules. Rather, legal doctrine is inevitably 
dependent upon juridically significant background assumptions and social 
visions and that the role of the legal theorist is to engage in the articulation of 
these assumptions and visions, to translate needs and aspirations into juridical 
form. 
E. The Synthesizing Function 
In a sense, the synthesizing function can be understood as a method of taking 
stock, of creating an inventory of where legal thought is at. Twining' s preferred 
metaphor here is that of a map. In this realm, the function of the jurist is:262 
to chart, and where appropriate, to redesign the general map of the intellectual milieu of 
the law ... to explore and articulate general frames of reference for law as an academic 
discipline. 
In the Charter context, particularly in relation to interpretive .theories and 
politico-juridical positioning, a host of authors have attempted to map the field: 
Bakan and Beatty are manichean, splitting the terrain between sceptics and 
believers;263 Weiler identifies pure-market libertarians (a non-existent breed in 
Canada), liberal romantics, radical cynics, and pragmatic pluralists;264 
Etherington talks about realists, liberal romantics, and liberal pragmatists;265 
while Herman spotlights debunkers, promoters, reactionaries, and pragmatists.266 
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F. The Ideological Function 
This is not a job for legal theory as is expressly addressed by Twining, 
although he does make one cursory comment on suggestions by "radical jurists" 
as to the legitimation function of jurisprudence.267 What I am a trying to suggest 
here is the role that jurists can play in identifying the intersections between law 
and power, and the way in which law and lawyers (in which category I include 
legal academics) both constitute and are constituted by such power. More 
particularly, this category will help us to identify the stances that legal theorists 
take when they come to terms with such intersections.268 Thus, while on one 
level it might have been appropriate to treat this category as a sub-category of the 
conduit function insofar as it draws clearly on insights from other disciplines, 
such an approach would deflate the question of the importance the ideological 
dimensions of jurisprudence. 
The concept of "ideology" is, of course, indeterminate. Generally, however, 
it can be understood as a prism through which one comes to terms with the 
relationship between ideas and reality. More precisely, and factoring in the 
crucial variable of power, there is a helpful insight to be called from Thompson's 
proposition that "[t]o study ideology ... is to· study the wais in which meaning 
( or signification) serves to sustain relations of domination." 69 In other words, the 
concept of ideology enables us to think about the way in which our modes of 
thought (re )present and filter material practices and experiences to us. Ideology 
takes seriously the relationship between knowledge and power notjust in the 
sense that to have knowledge is to-have power, but more in the sense that power 
relations constitute the nature, quality, categories and parameters of the 
knowledge that is available. This is particularly important for jurisprudence (and 
in particular Charter jurisprudence) because legal theory is not only passive and 
disinterested reflection on the nature and function of law; rather, it is, as the 
Australian jurist Valerie Kerruish argues, a proactive meaning disseminating 
practice, a cultural product. 270 Thus, in this section I want to suggest that those 
who have proclaimed "the end of ideology"271 have been premature, at least in 
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Ideologies can operate in a variety of ways. In its crudest form, ideology is 
associated with ideas of a conspiracy thesis through which the dominant elites 
maintain their power, not only by direct force but also by the process of 
inculcating in the oppressed classes a false consciousness. Few Charter scholars 
support such a conspiracy thesis. 272 A more cautious version suggests that such 
are the formative contexts of judges that they almost inevitably identify with and 
legitimize the perspectives of the elite of Canadian society.273 Charter decisions, 
particularly in the realm of labour law, have provided a great deal of data to 
support such analyses. 274 
The debate over whether property/economic rights can or should be included 
·as Charter rights is a good example of where the competing ideologies surface. 
While some argue in favour of such rights because property is in essence a 
natural right, liberty' s  "siamese twin,"275 others concur because it may provide 
minimum opportunities and rights for the dispossessed. 276 Others are opposed to 
locating such rights in the Charter either because it smacks of illegitimate 
judicial activism,277 or because of the dangers of further enhancing corporate 
power in Canada. 278 Similar ideological divisions are manifest in the debates 
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Similarly, it could be suggested that the debates on the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of the section 33 override provision (the technical legal questions 
of its relationship to section I and whether a court can review a legislature's 
invocation of the section procedurally or substantively) necessitates an 
articulation of competing conceptions of democracy.280 Moreover, it brings into 
particularly sharp relief the differences between those whose primary fidelity is 
to a deontological and individualistic worldview and those _who subscribe to a 
more communitarian and majoritarian worldview.281 
A more subtle theory still of ideology, argues in favour of false necessity 
analysis, that is, that ideology functions best by portraying certain beliefs as 
natural, inevitable, self-evident and therefore unchallengeable. 282 Such 
necessitariari sm is, in Bourdieu's terms, "doxa," a belief structure that so closely 
dovetails with common sense that it seems absurd to even question it.283 
Alternative ideas, practices or modes of social interaction are simply 
unimaginable and inconceivable. Examples might be the assumption that 
individual rights are by definition a good thing,284 the presupposition that the 
individual is the foundational unit of social analysis285 or the belief that 
constitutional decision making is principled rather than political.286 
"Heterodoxy" occurs when someone challenges the self-evidence of such 
truisms as to the virtue of individual rights. Heterodox jurists, as we have seen, 
advance several arguments against Charter ideology and discourse. "Orthodoxy" 
is a response to heterodoxy's challenge to doxa, the articulation of justifications 
for that which had formerly been taken for granted. Schwartz's rejection of 
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pragmatism in defense of feminist struggles with the equality provisions,288 
Dyzenhaus' egalitarian. liberalism,289 and Slattery' s  transcendent but practical 
defence of judicial decision making. 290 
The collective rights debate provides a useful illustration of this discursive 
spiral of doxa, heterodoxy and orthodoxy. Historically, within a liberal 
dominated frame of reference, it has been assumed that in their nature and by 
definition rights are essentially individualistic, and, therefore, any conception of 
group rights is simply nonsensical.291 This would be doxa. However, as already 
discussed, over the last decade or so there have been increasing demands for the 
recognition of collective rights.292 This might be heterodoxy. In reply, liberals 
have been forced to give reasons why there should be no recognition of 
collective rights, why rights should be preserved to an individualistic 
paradigm. 293 This is orthodoxy. 294 
Gramsci' s thoughts on "traditional" and "organic" intellectuals might also 
have some purchase in an analysis of the ideological context of Charter 
scholarship. 295 Traditionally, intellectuals have tended to be contemplative 
thinkers, scholars in the idealist tradition who seek a truth uncontaminated by 
politics, experience, identity or other partisan variables. The goal is the pursuit 
of objectivity, neutrality, and impartiality. Organic intellectuals, by contrast, 
deny the possibility of ever achieving such a "view from nowhere" to advocate 
the contrary argument that theory and experience are mutually constitutive. As 
members of oppressed social classes, they emphasize the pervasiveness of 
• perspectivism and, as self-conscious representatives of their social group, they 
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location that they represent. Organic intellectuals criticise the purism of the 
traditionalists as theoreticist and, therefore, complicitous in the perpetuation of 
oppressive social relations. Instead, organic intellectuals advocate a 
transformativist conception of theory: that the only legitimate purpose of theory 
is to help advance progressive political practice.296 Examples of such organic 
jurists might include advocates of lesbian and gay rights,297 First Nations 
spokespersons,298 people of colour, 299 disability rights activists, 300 or feminist 
practitioners. 301 It is more difficult to identify organic intellectuals on the basis 
of their class, because by the time one reaches the heady plateau of 
jurisprudence, one has more than likely become a member of the middle class 
and therefore is distanced from the working class community. 302 
To my mind, there is little doubt that Charter jurisprudence is deeply 
saturated in ideology, not just in the sense that some scholars make explicit their 
ideological preferences, but also in the sense that all scholarship is premised 
upon pervasive normative visions (whether they are articulated or not). In the 
next section I will indicate that this is a good thing. 
V. EVALUATIVE COMMENTS 
My aim in this paper has not been to distribute bouquets and brickbats to 
individual scholars. Consequently, in this section, in my attempt to analyze the 
relationship between the Charter and legal theory, I will: a) identify and discuss 
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jurisprudence� and b) briefly highlight some problems that may be worth further 
consideration. 
A. Positive Patterns 
The Charter may have done more for legal theory than legal theory has done 
for the Charter. Historically, legal theory has had a marginal existence in law 
and the legal academy, a poor relation in a family whose primary ambition has 
been to provide services to the social elites, balanced with a few philanthropic 
forays such as legal aid clinics or courses on poverty and welfare law. However, 
because of the manifestly social and political nature of legal decision-making in 
a Charter regime, the traditional gambits for rendering law autonomous and 
insular are no longer available. This has meant that legal theory as a practice has 
gained increasing legitimacy in legal circles as witnessed, for example, in even 
a few references to jurists by members of the Supreme Court. 303 It is important, 
however, not to overstate the instrumental significance of legal theory. Despite 
some calls from the judiciary for greater theoretical assistance304 and even the 
explicit invocation of jurisprudential perspectives on occasion, it seems to me 
that jurisprudence remains relatively unimportant. For example, even though the 
decision in Dolphin Delivery305 has received universal academic criticism from 
a number of very diverse jurisprudential perspectives, the Supreme Court seems 
to be adamant in its refusal to reconsider its position. 
More generally, it might be suggested that Charter theory has to some degree 
escaped the clutches of analytical positivism. Few scholars now invoke the 
discourse of natural law and legal positivism. 306 Consequently, legal theory 
appears to have become significantly more interdisciplinary and to have 
undergone a radical regeneration of interest. There has been a proliferation of 
more junior scholars whose work is explicitly and self-consciously 
jurisprudential. In short, the Charter has gone some way in liberating Canadian 
legal scholarship from what Alan Hunt has described as the "dark-age of 'black 
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Closely related to this, there seems to be a sense that theory is not significant 
for theory's own sake, but that it is important because of its utility in advancing 
one's normative viewpoint.308 More specifically, the literature seems to suggest 
that the vast majority of Canadian jurists tend to fall between the liberal and the 
left end of the political continuum. Thus, debates have tended to involve those 
who, very roughly, might be called the liberal egalitarian democrats309 and the 
radical progressives. 
However, two further points may be worth noting here. First, unlike political 
science or philosophy,310 within legal circles, few jurists adopt an explicitly 
right- wing orientation. Law and economics discourse, while influential in other 
aspects of Canadian jurisprudential life, has only had a marginal influence on 
Charter theory.311 The National Citizens Coalition and REAL Women, for 
example, appear to be without a jurisprudential spokesperson (so far).3 12 
Second, although I have suggested that the debate has tended to revolve 
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many legal theorists to attempt to make their jurisprudential arguments as accessible as 
possible. In part this may be connected to the contextualizing shift in much 
jurisprudence. Constitutional Forum, with its preference for short, pithy articles and 
comments is a particularly good example of the attempt to disseminate legal theory. See 
also D. Schneiderman, ed., Conversations Among Friends (Edmonton: Centre for 
Constitutional Studies, 199 1 ). ·For a rejection of this politicization of theory see B. 
Langille, "Political World" ( 1989) 3 Can J. L. & Jur. 1 39. 
Gibson, for example, describes his work as reflective of the "radical or principled 
middle." The Law of the Charter: General Principles, supra note 22 at iv-v. 
See A. Dobrowolsky, "The Charter and Mainstream Political Science: Waves of 
Practical Contestation and Changing Theoretical Currents" in D. Schneiderman & K. 
Sutherland, eds., Charting the Consequences: The Impact of Charter Rights on Law 
and Politics in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997). 
Talking Heads and the Supremes, supra note 22 at 1 16. See also R. Sharpe, "Mootness, 
Abstract Questions and Alternative Grounds: Deciding Whether to Decide" in Sharpe, 
supra note 23 at 327; T. Lee & M. Trebilcock, "Economic Mobility and Constitutional 
Reform" (1987) 37 U.T.L.J. 268. 
But see R. Martin, "Bill C-49: A Victory for Interest Group Politics" (1993) 42 
U.N.B.L.J. 357 and Martin & Hawkins, supra note 35. Although I do not subscribe to · 
the currently popular view that left-right distinctions are passe, there are times when 
there appears to be a certain commonality between some on the legal left and those on 
the political right, particularly with regard to criticisms of the antidemocratic nature of 
judicial review. See, for example, Bogart, supra note 22 at 148-49 who is not only 
ambivalent about distinctions between "socialism and toryism," but who also invokes 
the American papal apologist Mary Ann Glendon in his partial critique of the 
Morgentaler decision. See also Mandel, supra note 8 at 73. 
Revue d'etudes constitutionnelles 
68 Richard F. Devlin 
not be mistaken for a claim that the latter group espouse a uniform position. 
Rather there have been fractionalizations over time. While there are some 
holdouts who insist that the Charter is incapable of being hijacked for 
progressive ends,3 13 there are now strong signs of left revisionism which 
advocates a more nuanced position which may allow for Charter mobilization, 
depending upon the issues.314  
Two examples might illustrate this fractionalization among progressives. 
Some on the left have argued in favour of a Social Charter as a defence 
mechanism against the rightward shift in Canadian politics, whereas others have 
argued that such a strategy is simply symbolic soft law that firetends to advance 
real human needs while in fact achieving nothing concrete. 15 Similarly, within 
the feminist movement there have been pointed disagreements over, for 
example, tax deductions on the basis of gender and race,3 16 pornography, 3 17 
prostitution,31 8  the most appropriate vision of equality319 and, indeed, the appro­
priateness of litigational politics at all. Similarly, there have been lesbian 
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critiques of both (heterosexual) feminist jurisprudence and (gay dominated) 
sexual orientation jurisprudence. 320 
At least three interpretations can be advanced as to the significance of this 
pluralization of progressive voices. First, it might be suggested that many 
progressive jurists have adopted a position of Derridean undecidability thereby 
relinquishing grand theories in favour of more localized and context sensitive 
politico-juridical strategizing.321 Alternatively, one might conjecture that the 
Charter debates il_lustrate yet another failure to consolidate solidarity among 
progressives,322 and that radical jurists have been overwhelmed by a discursive 
regime that is undesirable, but unavoidable. 323 As a consequence, it could be 
argued that while the left are all over the map in terms of what to do about the 
Charter, conservative and corporate forces have (apparently without a great deal 
of jurisprudential reinforcement or direction) seized the opportunity created by 
the Charter and effectively pursued a regressive politico-juridical agenda. Third, 
and less pessimistically, one could interpret debates among progressive jurists 
not on the basis of their impact on social and judicial policymaking, but focus 
more upon the quality of the debates themselves. Viewed in this light, there is 
no doubt that progressive legal theory is blossoming in Canada and that there is 
an openness and spirit of engagement that is heartening. 324 
To me this fractionalization suggests a certain irony. Debates within 
contemporary literary criticism in the last decade or so have tended to suggest 
that we must confront the death of the author thesis, that is, that authorial intent 
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interpretations.325 A reflection on the relationship between the Charter and its 
jurisprudential interlocutors dovetails with this thesis. As many scholars have 
suggested, the Charter was designed primarily by the federal government as part 
of a unifying and nation-building strategy, to enhance the collective psyche of 
a Canadian identity that would counteract the centrifugal forces disaggregating 
the country, most particularly provincialism and regionalism.326 However, as this 
review of the literature has indicated, at least in the realm of jurisprudence, the 
effect seems to have been the opposite . While it would be somewhat linear to 
suggest that the Charter has caused327 jurisprudential polarisation, it is probably 
accurate to suggest that Charter discourse has provided a forum 'for dissensus, 
an opportunity for divergences, the ramifications of which are more immediately 
apparent than, for example, the differences around federalism might suggest. 
Moreover, the dissensus is not superficial. It has necessitated careful 
reconsideration of our assumptions about the nature of the state328 and it has 
called into question fundamental visions of what a good society should strive to 
be, with very different conceptions of rights, liberty, freedom, and equality and 
the balances that need to be drawn between them. Indeed, as the arguments 
advanced by Turpel indicate, the problems may not just be those of divergence, 
but of an incommensurability of legal cultures in which the Charter is 
reunderstood as cultural, political, constitutional and juridical colonialism. 329 Not 
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This fragmentation of the jurispruc;iential conversation has come about, I 
would suggest, because the nature of political discourse in Canada has 
undergone transition in the last two decades. Since Confederation, traditionally 
the primary focus of political concern has been the federalist dilemma: how to 
allocate power between provinces and the central government. Other political 
controversies have been filtered through the federalist paradigm. 331 But in the last 
twenty years, there has been an increasing awareness of how other political 
debates are autonomous from and have dynamics independent of those of 
federalism, though at times they may intersect with the federalist dilemma. These 
political orientations are not so much about geographical or territorial jockeying, 
· but rather are connected to the emergence in western societies of what are called 
the "new social movements" with an increasing emphasis on identity politics, 
that is, a politics that is particularly related to issues of (dis)ability, gender, class, 
sexual orientation and/or race.332 The Charter has been targeted as a terrain of 
ideological discourse where identity jurisprudences can be articulated, pursued, 
contested, challenged, legitimized and devalued333 resulting in judicial decisions 
that are sometimes unpredictable. And it is this lack of predictability that will 
ensure a continued jurisprudential engagement because, like it or not, Charter 
discourse has taken on a life of its own. Social actors can no longer choose to 
ignore it, because unless you are prepared to argue even as a strategy of 
resistance, others will use it against you. 334 
However, none of this is to claim that many of these developments could not 
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generated by theorists who have not been entranced by the Charter. 335 While at 
an earlier time, I have been too hasty in suggesting that the Charter has caused 
a "sea-change" for Canadian legal theory,336 I still believe that there is a 
connection, though not causal. The Charter, I believe, has provided a forum in 
which jurisprudence can demonstrate its importance. Whereas other areas of law 
- contracts, property or torts - clearly have a significant impact on our social 
ordering, the broader perception of these is that they are esoteric and that, 
correlatively, theory about such esotericism can only be esotericism squared. The 
Charter, on the other hand, tends to be more publicly accessible and engenders 
greater symbolic significance; therefore, when theory is invoked to help shed 
light, it is seen have some further legitimacy. 
A good example may be found in relation to Langille's analysis of judicial 
interpretation of the Charter. 337 To bolster his analysis he invoked Wittgenstein. 
This, in tum, led other theorists to question his use of Wittgenstein338 or to 
invoke countervailing theorists,339 which in turn triggered further 
Wittgensteinian-inspired rejoinders from Langille and others.340 So while there 
is no logical reason why Wittgenstein could not have been the subject of legal 
theory by Canadian jurists, the opportunity was grounded in Charter-inspired 
concerns. 
A second example may be found in the various discussions around individual 
and collective rights. While groupist rights were part of the Canadian 
constitutional order prior to 1982, the Charter served as a catalyst to intensify 
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law have engendered debates that are to a significant degree ontological, that is, 
based on competing· conceptions about the nature of personhood. 341 
A third example also focuses on the question of rights. As I have already 
pointed out, orthodoxy assumes that the purpose of rights is to protect the 
individual. However, critics of rights have argued that it is only certain interests 
of the individual that are protected by rights and that many of our needs are 
ignored. In reply, deviationists have argued that rights are important to the extent 
that they engender self-valorization among those who are marginalized. But 
again others, in tum, ask what sort of self or individual is presumed by such 
claims to empowerment: is it an essentialist conception of the self or a socially 
constructed sense of the self, a static self or a transgressive self, etc?342 
Thus, in my estimation, the most significant impact of the Charter has been 
to provide a forum, or more accurately, a discursive opportunity for the 
articulation by legal theorists of their conceptions not only of law (its nature, its 
functions, its strengths and its limitations), but also of society, the state, the 
family and the self. Conklin's work is particularly illustrative as he shifts his "the 
constitution as imagery" theory first through debates on Canadian federalism to 
Charter interpretation, arguing that the latter tend to trigger pressing debates 
about "deep meta-issues of theory and a piercing scrutiny of social/cultural 
practice."343 In short, for better or worse, the Charter has transformed Canada's 
legal and political "langscape"344 and jurisprudence, as a dialect within that 
langscape, has inevitably been impacted by this transformation. 
Another question which sometimes arises is whether there is anything 
distinctive about Canadian jurisprudence. On occasion, some scholars have 
suggested that either in general345 or with specific regard to the Charter346 there 
is something particular about Canadian legal theory and constitutional practice. 
As the preceding overview might suggest, debates on the issues of individualism 
and communitarianism,judicial absolutism and democratic politics, gender, race, 
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legal theory. Indeed, many Canadian scholars, explicitly and implicitly, often 
rely on the insights of leading American theorists. But there remain some 
important differences. As might be obvious, in my opinion the voice of 
progressive scholars is quite strong in Canada whereas in the United States -
despite the emergence of feminism, critical legal studies and critical race theory 
- the primary axis of debate remains right vs. liberal rather than liberal vs. left. 
Second, whereas privacy and liberty have been the lodestars for much American 
jurisprudence, it would appear that equality discourse has been given a particular 
spin by Canadian legal theorists. Third, although every democracy faces the 
difficult jurisprudential debate about the legitimacy of judicial review, it has a 
particular focus and accent in Canada, given that it is the only jurisdiction in the 
world to have a section 33 override provision. 
Finally, on the theme of positive patterns, I want briefly to address the issue 
of the tone of contemporary jurisprudential debate. Traditionally, debates within 
legal theory have tended to be quite polite and when disagreements arose they 
were often stated indirectly. However, with the advent of the Charter the 
traditional decorum of debates has, on occasion, given way to heated 
engagement. While not deteriorating into mutual ad hominems, frequently 
contemporary disputes are articulated with a pointedness that until now has been 
somewhat unusual.347 David Beatty, in particular, seems to have attracted 
particular attention. 348 In my opinion such a shift in tone is not something that we 
should be too concerned about. All it indicates is that the issues at stake matter; 
that jurisprudence is not solely the abstract pursuit of pure knowledge (although 
some may aspire to that) but also is a practice which can have direct and 
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B. Potential Problems 
While I am clearly impressed with recent developments in Anglophone legal 
theory, there are (as might be expected) some problems. 
First, as pointed out earlier, a great deal of Charter-based jurisprudence has 
been preoccupied with the issue of the legitimacy of judicial review. While this 
is clearly important, it seems to me that after fifteen years many of the arguments 
(both pro and c·on) are fairly clearly formulated and that on occasion some 
scholars are starting to sound like broken records.350 Perhaps then there is more 
room for discussion of issues such as republicanism,351 or greater efforts could 
be taken to be more programmatic in developing theories. Reconstructionists 
such as Nedelsky and Trakman are still extremely abstract in their visions, while 
strategic skeptics need to do more to concretize their thoughts on when Charter 
engagement may be desirable or not, or delineate possible alternative 
structures. 352 
Moreover, within the Charter itself, there appears to be a somewhat uneven 
jurisprudential division of labour. For example, while freedom of expression, 
freedom of association and the equality provisions seem to have generated a 
great deal of attention, the legal rights provisions (with the exception of those 
that deal with issues of gender353) appear to be under theorized354 even though 
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regime. Similarly, the pressing and extremely vital issue of Charter remedies has 
gained only a relatively small amount of jurisprudential analysis. 355 
Third, there is also the problem that because so many jurists have been 
attracted to Charter analyses other pressing political and social problems have 
been underanalyzed. For example, NAFT A �as generated minimal 
jurisprudential consideration,356 and federalism (and in particular its interplay 
with the Charter) has been put on the backbumer by theorists even though it has 
been of crucial political significance. 357 
Finally, as pointed out previously, Canadian jurisprudence has been attracted 
to the interpretive, the idea that what binds us together legally and politically is 
an implied commitment to ongoing debate, conversation and dialogue. This is 
obviously an attractive metaphor in that it assumes a basic substratum of 
commonality that makes social, political, and legal interaction plausible and 
intelligible. However, one problem with this metaphor is that its abstraction 
allows it to be invoked by jurists of very different stripes. While it is true that not 
all Canadian jurists buy into the metaphor - Mandel for example wants us 
(who?) back on the streets,358 and others warn us that conversational metaphors 
can reinforce oppression359 or obscure situational inequalities360 - my sense is 
that too many Canadian jurists fetishize the metaphor of dialogue. In a sense, it 
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jurisprudence seminar.361 While many recognize problems with the metaphor, to 
my mind most underestimate just how deep our differences might be. 
For example, the assumption seems to be that the differences are _essentially 
substantive and that with sufficient communicative goodwill it is possible to 
eventually get to yes.362 However, there are several problems here. First, and 
obviously, politics and power are driven as much by bad faith as by good faith 
and this inevitable reality cannot be glossed over. Second, even assuming that 
parties to a politico-juridical dialogue were to operate in good faith, there is the 
question of what language they are to communicate in. The assumptions here 
appear to be twofold: language is equally available to all, and that language is 
basically transparent and neutral.363 But again, not everyone has equal access to 
language, either qualitatively or quantitatively, thus there is the danger of the 
"dictatorship of the articulate."364 Moreover, a language is not just a medium, it 
also captures and refracts specific cultural norms and practices that are not 
always translatable.365 No where in the Anglophone scholarship reviewed have 
I encountered a jurist even considering whether the dialogue should be in a 
language other than English. This is not just a political or moral problem, which 
would be serious enough; it is also epistemological. Third, advocates of 
dialogism concur that the conversation should remain continually open, but 
again there are at least two problems here: a) do most citizens really have that 
much time available?; b) at some point some decisions have to be made, even 
relatively temporary ones, and so some mechanisms for closure are inevitable, 
or else some players may continue to discuss simply to avoid ever getting to a 
resolution.366 In short, when we unpack it the premise underlying the dialogic 
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and counter-offering, of giving and taking. But this is a deeply optimistic vision 
for, as Carol Pateman has pointed out, contract rather than being the apotheosis 
of freedom and choice might well be a highly refined form of subordination. 367 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Rod MacDonald once pessimistically bemoaned that "the summer of 1982" 
was characterized by the "quiescence of Canadian legal theorists."368 Fortunately, 
to my mind, this slumber did not last long. Indeed, as I have attempted to 
demonstrate in this essay, Charter-driven jurisprudence has had a significant 
impact, both quantitively and qualitatively, on Anglophone Canadian legal 
scholarship. 
Thought and theory clearly have their limits, and Canadian society is unlikely 
to take its cue from the ruminations of academics. But while theory is not 
everything, it is more than nothing. Theory is only as important as the context 
and circumstances in which it is produced, disseminated and given effect. In that 
sense, it should not be considered to be in opposition to practice, but rather as 
another form of practice, a terrain of discursive struggle that intersects and 
overlaps with other social practices. 
Moreover, as this essay suggests, there is no longer much consensus on what 
might constitute the core of jurisprudential analysis. Rather, with the 
mushrooming of legal theoretical work, there has been increasing dissensus and 
. a corresponding emergence of what might be most usefully described as 
jurisprudential pluralism. In other words, it is probably not helpful to think of 
jurisprudence as a static paradigm, but rather as terrain of struggle in which 
several incommensurable paradigms are in play, a constellation of incongruent 
and dynamic discourses.369 If this is accurate then it seems to me to be unhelpful 
to conceive of legal theory in an instrumentalist sense, as the source of 
determinative right answers, as Dickson C.J. seemed to have hoped.370 
Jurisprudence is not oracular. What theory can do, however, is to help us identify 
and rethink some of the assumptions we take for granted. Moreover, it can reveal 
to us the contingency of such assumptions and thereby facilitate the recognition 
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Charter cannot be said to have caused this fractionalization in Canadian legal 
theory, Charter based claims and Charter discourse has been an important 
discursive terrain for the articulation of this dissensus.371 In short, the Charter is 
both fractured and fracturing. And so I would conclude by suggesting that rather 
than promoting order and coherence, contemporary Charter-inspired legal theory 
refracts the messiness of the problematic that is called Canada. 
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